Healthcare for Profit
Detailed proposal and questions for review · Updated November 1, 2026
When the Customer's Death Is More Profitable Than Their Life
The Core Thesis
The concern is whether payment arrangements reward access, prevention and useful care or create incentives for avoidable billing, denial and market power. Profit is not itself incompatible with care: the proposal retains private providers and seeks to align their incentives with patient outcomes. Communities would direct spending under state oversight, with Stability Accounts as the long-term funding foundation.
The Numbers: What We Pay vs. What We Get
Figures retained in this discussion are earlier draft estimates or scenarios unless a dated source is cited here. They are not current measurements, adopted budgets or validated AIP outcomes. Use the linked policy chapter for the current mechanism and corrected arithmetic.
What We Spend
- Total US healthcare spending (2023): $4.5 trillion
- Per capita: $13,493/person (highest in world)
- Percentage of GDP: 17.3% (highest in world)
- Comparison - Germany: $7,383/person, universal coverage
- Comparison - UK: $5,138/person, universal coverage
- Comparison - Canada: $5,741/person, universal coverage
- We spend 2-3x more per person than comparable countries
What We Get
- Life expectancy: 76.4 years (46th globally, lowest among wealthy nations)
- Infant mortality: 5.4/1,000 (highest among wealthy nations)
- Maternal mortality: 23.8/100,000 (highest among wealthy nations, rising)
- Preventable deaths: Highest rate among peer countries
- Uninsured: 28 million (8.5%)
- Underinsured: 40+ million more
- Medical debt: $220 billion, #1 cause of bankruptcy
We pay the most and get the worst outcomes among wealthy nations. This isn't failure—it's the predictable result of a profit-optimized system.
The Perverse Incentives
Figures retained in this discussion are earlier draft estimates or scenarios unless a dated source is cited here. They are not current measurements, adopted budgets or validated AIP outcomes. Use the linked policy chapter for the current mechanism and corrected arithmetic.
Insurance Companies: Profit From Denial
Health insurance companies make money by collecting premiums and denying claims. Their incentive structure:
- Revenue: Premiums collected (more is better)
- Costs: Claims paid (less is better)
- Profit = Premiums - Claims - Overhead
- Therefore: Every denied claim is profit. Every approved claim is loss.
The business model:
- Deny claims initially (many people give up)
- Require prior authorization (delays care, some die waiting)
- Create networks that exclude expensive specialists
- Hire doctors specifically to deny claims ("medical directors")
- Make appeals processes Byzantine and exhausting
- Drop unprofitable (sick) customers when possible
- Raise premiums faster than wages, forever
Administrative overhead: Private insurance: 15-30%. Medicare: 2-3%. The difference is the cost of denying care—claims reviewers, appeals processors, prior auth staff, lawyers, executives, shareholders.
Hospitals: Profit From Volume and Acuity
Hospitals make money from procedures, not outcomes. Incentives:
- More procedures = more revenue. Unnecessary tests, surgeries, and interventions are profitable.
- Sicker patients = higher reimbursement. Prevention reduces revenue.
- Emergency care = maximum billing. Primary care that prevents emergencies is less profitable.
- Readmissions = more revenue. Actually fixing the problem means one-time payment.
- Consolidation = pricing power. Buy competitors, raise prices, no alternatives.
"Non-profit" hospitals: Same incentives, just called "surplus" instead of "profit." Executives still make millions. They still sue patients for medical debt. They still close unprofitable (poor neighborhood) facilities.
Pharmaceutical Companies: Profit From Sickness
Pharma makes money from chronic disease, not cures. Incentives:
- Maintenance drugs > cures. Insulin for life beats cure for diabetes. Monthly prescriptions beat one-time treatments.
- Patent games: "Evergreening" extends monopolies. Pay generic makers to delay. Reformulate to restart clock.
- Price whatever market bears: Insulin costs $3-8 to make, sells for $300-400. Epinephrine (EpiPen) went from $100 to $600+.
- Marketing > R&D: Pharma spends 2x on marketing/admin as on research. Create demand, don't solve problems.
- Opioid crisis: Pharma made billions pushing addictive drugs. 500,000+ dead. Companies paid fines, kept profits.
- Orphan drugs: Price rare disease treatments at $100K-2M/year. Patients pay or die.
Doctors: Profit From Fee-for-Service
Most doctors genuinely want to help patients. But the system pays them for doing things, not for outcomes:
- 15-minute appointments maximize billing
- Ordering tests generates revenue
- Referrals to specialists (in your group) increase revenue
- Procedures pay 3-10x more than cognitive work (talking, thinking)
- Spending time on prevention doesn't pay
- Documentation for billing consumes hours that could go to patients
Good doctors fight these incentives constantly. The system is designed to make good medicine harder and less profitable than bad medicine.
Where the Money Goes
Figures retained in this discussion are earlier draft estimates or scenarios unless a dated source is cited here. They are not current measurements, adopted budgets or validated AIP outcomes. Use the linked policy chapter for the current mechanism and corrected arithmetic.
The Overhead Tax
- Administrative costs: $1+ trillion/year (25-30% of total spending)
- Billing and insurance-related costs: $500+ billion/year
- Comparison: Canada spends 17% on admin, we spend 34%
- The difference: ~$500 billion/year wasted on bureaucracy that exists only because of our fragmented system
Executive Compensation
- Health insurance CEO pay (2023):
- UnitedHealth: $23.5 million
- CVS/Aetna: $21.3 million
- Cigna: $21.1 million
- Elevance (Anthem): $20.9 million
- Humana: $16.7 million
- Paid to deny your claims.
- Hospital CEO pay:
- Average large hospital CEO: $1-5 million
- Top "non-profit" hospital CEOs: $10-25 million
- Same hospitals suing patients for medical debt
Shareholder Returns
- Health insurance profits (2023): $40+ billion combined
- Pharma profits: $100+ billion
- Hospital system profits: $50+ billion
- Stock buybacks and dividends: Tens of billions annually
- Every dollar to shareholders is a dollar not spent on care.
The Human Cost
Figures retained in this discussion are earlier draft estimates or scenarios unless a dated source is cited here. They are not current measurements, adopted budgets or validated AIP outcomes. Use the linked policy chapter for the current mechanism and corrected arithmetic.
Deaths
- Deaths from lack of insurance: 26,000-45,000/year (various studies)
- Deaths from underinsurance: Unknown but substantial (people skip care due to cost)
- Deaths from delayed care: Prior authorization kills (documented cases of patients dying while waiting for approval)
- Deaths from medical errors: 250,000+/year (third leading cause of death)
- Opioid deaths: 500,000+ cumulative (pharma-driven epidemic)
Financial Devastation
- Medical bankruptcy: 530,000 families/year (66% of all bankruptcies)
- Medical debt: $220 billion total, 100 million Americans affected
- GoFundMe: 1/3 of campaigns are for medical bills. This is our system.
- Rationing: 40% of Americans skipped care due to cost in past year
- Insulin rationing: 1 in 4 diabetics ration insulin. Some die.
- Medical debt on credit reports: Ruins credit, affects housing, employment, everything
The Fear Tax
Beyond the deaths and bankruptcies is the constant fear. Fear of getting sick. Fear of losing job (and insurance). Fear of the bill. Fear that a diagnosis means financial ruin. Fear of calling an ambulance. Americans live with a background terror that citizens of other wealthy nations don't experience. This is a form of violence.
Why It Persists
Figures retained in this discussion are earlier draft estimates or scenarios unless a dated source is cited here. They are not current measurements, adopted budgets or validated AIP outcomes. Use the linked policy chapter for the current mechanism and corrected arithmetic.
Political Capture
- Healthcare industry lobbying: $700+ million/year (largest of any industry)
- Campaign contributions: $200+ million/cycle to both parties
- Lobbyists: 5+ for every member of Congress
- Revolving door: FDA, HHS officials become industry executives
- Result: Medicare can't negotiate drug prices (until minimal 2022 law). Public option killed. Single-payer "off the table."
Ideological Capture
- "Socialism" scare: Universal healthcare labeled socialist, despite working in every other wealthy nation
- "Choice" rhetoric: Americans have "choice" of unaffordable plans that don't cover care
- "Innovation" argument: US profits supposedly fund global R&D (mostly false—NIH funds basic research)
- "Long waits" scare: Meanwhile Americans wait weeks for appointments, ration insulin, die waiting for prior auth
Employer Trap
Employer-sponsored insurance (an accident of WWII wage controls) creates job lock. People stay in bad jobs for insurance. Entrepreneurs don't start businesses. Workers don't demand better conditions. Employers have leverage. The system is a control mechanism as much as a healthcare system.
The AIP Solution
Figures retained in this discussion are earlier draft estimates or scenarios unless a dated source is cited here. They are not current measurements, adopted budgets or validated AIP outcomes. Use the linked policy chapter for the current mechanism and corrected arithmetic.
Remove Profit From the Equation
AIP provides universal healthcare funded through Stability Accounts. Healthcare becomes infrastructure—like roads, fire departments, police. You don't profit from firefighting. You shouldn't profit from healing.
The Structure
- Universal coverage: Everyone covered, birth to death, no exceptions
- Funded through accounts: Healthcare costs deducted from Stability Account growth, capped to prevent catastrophic drain
- Private delivery: Doctors and hospitals remain private—compete on quality, not on denying care
- Administration: community-governed payment arrangements with state oversight. Administrative savings require comparable cost definitions and measurement.
- Prevention focus: System paid to keep you healthy (saves money), not to treat sickness (generates money)
- No medical debt: Costs covered, bankruptcy eliminated
- No insurance companies: The middlemen extracting $40B+ in profit while denying care—eliminated
The Incentive Realignment
- Old incentive: Profit from sickness
- New incentive: System funded by healthy, productive workers paying into accounts. Healthy population = larger tax base = more funding. Prevention pays.
- Providers compete on outcomes: You choose your doctor. Doctors/hospitals with better outcomes attract patients. Quality, not extraction, wins.
The Results
- Universal coverage (28 million currently uninsured)
- Lower total spending (admin savings alone: $500B+)
- Better outcomes (prevention focus, no rationing)
- No medical bankruptcy
- No job lock (insurance not tied to employer)
- Employers save $15K/employee
- No fear tax
Discussion Questions for Validators
- Is the 'profit is the problem' thesis too simplistic? What role does profit play positively?
- How do we maintain innovation incentives without profit-driven pharma?
- What happens to the 2.7 million insurance industry employees?
- Is private delivery with public funding the right hybrid?
- How does this interact with Stability Account mechanics?
- What's the political path given industry capture of both parties?
Scope: This document presents a strongly critical view of American healthcare. The data on spending, outcomes, and incentives is well-documented. Validators are invited to challenge the framing and suggest where profit does serve useful functions in healthcare delivery.
Implementation and evaluation
Communities decide service priorities and payment arrangements; states oversee access and remedies. Measure waiting times, outcomes, out-of-pocket exposure and total administrative costs. The patient’s account obligation must be capped by an explicit funded rule.
Read the related policy chapter · Submit a specific critique